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VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY

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U.S. Intelligence Requirements for the Late 1980's

TERRORISM AND THE SOVIET UNION

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IN PUTTING before you some of the urgent intelligence requirements for the late 1980's, and knowing that 45 minutes hardly provides an interval sufficient to do this, I would have been tempted to immediately plunge into the specific tasks made urgent by the rapidly changing world environment.

However, a 3-hour television drama co-authored by a Pulitzer Prize-winning Washington journalist helped illuminate further what has for some time been my conviction — that the functioning of U.S. foreign intelligence will remain seriously hampered until the American people better understand the nature of the role of foreign intelligence, the importance of its functioning, and its indispensability if peace is to be preserved. The relevance of that TV drama is that it illuminated some of the reasons for the continuing crisis of confidence in our government. The program was "Under Siege," and I will now quote a few lines from an extensive critical review in the *New York Times'* Sunday television section on February 9:

"'Under Siege' is about domestic terrorism, and it's both chilling and muddled. Americans get blown to bits; the Capitol is hit by rockets. The principal terrorist says, 'My only goal is to teach — to educate America what it is to suffer as so many third-world people suffered so many times before.' What's chilling is that this is a three-hour made-for-TV movie on a major network, and that at the end of the movie we're meant to dislike not so much the terrorists as the United States Government . . .

'Under Siege,' slick, glossy, with drumbeats punctuating its score, knows who the enemy is: It's not the terrorists; it's us . . .

True to itself to the end, meanwhile, 'Under Siege' winds down with the CIA breaking the law. This is followed by a massive Government cover-up."

We have in recent months been exposed to the shame of a number of Americans who have sold some of our most sensitive intelligence information to the Soviet Union and other foreign governments. It appears that they have done so not because a Marxist-Leninist conviction spurred their betrayal. It is said they did so for substantial monetary rewards. What is not said is that one consequence of neutralizing public support of intelligence, if not in fact portraying it as a shameful activity, is to remove the element of shame and betrayal which would to some extent serve to inhibit those who seek to earn ready cash or act out neurotic impulses which are not ideological but deeply personal.

One of the intelligence tasks which confronts us requires that public indignation against the traitors accompany their dishonor. Legal punishment may prove far weaker than social indignation and contempt.

I regard this aspect of our requirements for the remaining years of this decade as so important that I will elaborate at the sacrifice of detailing some of the specific tasks which must be performed by the intelligence community. It is essential to that enlarged role of intelligence that it be understood by the media and the public and that its essential role be accepted. Let me restate that role:

Its primary purpose is to avert war by alerting us to any dangers to our national security. The second role of intelligence is to help us to make the wise judgments needed to retain our strength — military, political and economic — against the many threats to each of these — and some of these dangers will grow in the years ahead.

We are living in a world in which our interdependence increases more quickly than we are able to assimilate the significance of that interdependence. That interdependence involves manufacture and trade, commodities and credit communications, vital resources and ideas. That interdependence also has the effect of stimulating tensions, between nations and instability within them. The technological developments which have revolutionized world banking and the transfer of credit is fraught with consequences which cry for prompt and accurate assessments. We are dependent increasingly, even for our vital sources of military strength, on capabilities and resources which are diminishing here and increasing elsewhere.

Intelligence is an indispensable tool which enables us to understand the consequences of this rapid movement to a profoundly changed and interdependent world; enabling us to devise policies which enhance our ability to shape our destiny.

The essence of the difference of intelligence in the democracies and the Marxist-Leninist states is that the normal purpose of our foreign intelligence is to buttress stability, make change as unturbulent as possible. It essentially seeks to protect the democratic order. And its errors and bias tend toward the maintenance of the status quo — on occasion a flawed status quo.

The KGB's role is almost the precise opposite except within its political domain. Its function is to generate and exploit turbulence. "The worse, the better" is an old Russian nihilist maxim which aptly describes the nihilist thrust of Leninist intelligence activities wherever stability exists. The Soviet intelligence apparatus is inherently the provocateur, the merchant of disorder, the magnifier of social, economic or political weakness or distress. It is the ultimate force which enhances the possibility of conflict, careful only that the flames ignited not singe the flame thrower.

One of the requirements for the late 80's is to confront the fact that there are those among intellectuals who are blind to an adversary which prohibits ideas. Peacemakers exist who are

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uncritically ready to serve a perpetual war-making machine. Journalists develop myopia when confronted with a system which prohibits the freedom of the press. Writers fail to be outraged by a mechanism which corsets and commands the writer. Civil libertarians are slow to criticize a system which most completely obliterates civil freedoms. Celebrated artists remain blind to a system from which artists flee.

It is said that Marxist-Leninism as an ideology no longer exerts the appeal it once did, and in a sense that's true. Nevertheless, each of the previous paradoxes remain and are now expressed not by yesterday's adulation of the warmaker, the USSR, but by a constant and undiminished opposition to those who would keep the Kremlin's dangerous propensities in check. In short, *we*, not *they*, are the enemy.

Today's and tomorrow's society differ in critical respects from the international military environment which essentially ended with World War II.

Among the 42 current conflicts involving 4 million people engaged in wars, rebellions or civil uprisings, few nations have declared war upon another. This ambiguity about hostility today which places a particular premium upon effective intelligence.

The massive lethal power possessed by the great nations — and most particularly the United States and the USSR — has had a still inadequately understood effect upon warfare. Smaller nations are infinitely more free to take belligerent action than are the two muscle-bound giants. This does not mean that we are equally paralyzed or that the U.S. and the USSR adapt to this reality similarly. The belligerent propensities of smaller nations all too often involve the interests of the superpowers, and somewhat less often, the participation by a superpower by means short of war. How, where and why such indirect intervention occurs is a crucial difference between us. So too is the freedom or eagerness with which such indirect action occurs.

The Soviet Union has pressed to the hilt the use of proxy nations to perform its purposes — content to rely on our fear of wider war to keep us largely paralyzed.

Within this rubric we have seen the growth of a new form of war — terrorism — supported, if not spawned by nations virtually secure in the absence of risk to themselves. Such involvement is invariably supported by the Soviet Union and its client states — as eagerly as joint action to punish those who unleash terror is shunned by our allies.

There will be no more difficult task for intelligence in the years ahead than to penetrate the small fanatic groups which perform the terrorist acts, groups which are utterly without moral restraint and which hold the innocent in complete contempt. But that intelligence task becomes a nearly impossible one unless there is a better understanding that terrorism is itself simply another form of warfare.

One of the most penetrating and accurate descriptions of the true nature of terrorism was contained in a statement which emerged from a conference on "State Terrorism and the International System," held under the auspices of the International Security Council in Tel Aviv a month ago. Sixty prominent senior statesmen, active and retired military officers and national security specialists from 12 countries convened to consider the character and extent of state-sponsored terrorism. Among their conclusions, the following are particularly penetrating:

"The problem indeed is not just loose, gang-like incursions. It is terrorism — state-sponsored, state-supported,

state-condoned, and even state-directed. Tyrannical and totalitarian ideologies have now subscribed to a new gospel of violence as an instrument of political change. A 'Radical Entente' presently spearheaded by five militant states (Syria, Libya, Iran, North Korea and Cuba) is making coordinated efforts — by themselves and with others — to undermine the power and influence of the United States and its allies. Here the well documented role of the Soviet Union is to provide the professional infrastructure of terrorism including money, arms, explosives, recruitment and training, passports, infiltration and escape routes, transport, communications, safe havens, control officers, and more. Taken together, these constitute an elaborate international network of support systems for terrorists. "This is not to suggest that the Soviets push the

buttons and that their hand is always, directly or indirectly, in play. None of us subscribe to that kind of oversimplification. But where they do not initiate it, they encourage it. The destabilization and subversion have a pattern which serves Soviet interests, and this must be faced by leaders of the Free World even if for the moment, it is not high on the official diplomatic agenda. Both lives and liberties are at stake. We must learn more about what we are dealing with — and do more about it."

Meanwhile the Soviet Union has pursued twin objectives during all the years since World War II's end: to separate the U.S. and Western Europe while mounting a relentless, sophisticated and surprisingly effective propaganda campaign to persuade the world that peace is USSR's true purpose and that the risk to that peace resides in Washington, not Moscow. And the Soviet Union has perfected the manipulation of proxy bodies essential to the propagation of that all too widely accepted fantasy.

A great danger to stability is surprise. It is the vital attribute of terrorism and aggression. Intelligence is our only available instrument to keep these disasters in check.

Terrorism provides the clearest spotlight with which to illuminate the true purpose of intelligence. Virtually none of the critics of our intelligence efforts extend their distaste to include intelligence designed to alert us to impending terror or to identify the terrorist perpetrators once they have struck. Yet in no respect is the function of intelligence, whether analytic or clandestine, different when applied to the frightful consequences of terrorism than it is when applied to other international hazards, some of which involve the threat to life and human safety which are infinitely greater.

In an all-too-brief description of the essential functions of intelligence, I earlier referred to a contribution of intelligence which will be of increasing importance with each passing month of these years ahead: to protect not only our nation's freedom, security and stability, but to enhance the safety and stability of all the nations which seek to avert war and cultivate their own growth with minimal risks to their own tranquility.

It is here that the rapid growth of interdependence is especially relevant. Let me list a few of the major dangers in which intelligence is an indispensable tool.

A decision was made by a handful of men which led to a reduction in the price of oil — a price reduction by more than a third in less than a month. The life and death of nations and their economies will rest on how low that price falls. Some nations will benefit. Others face unmanageable social and economic

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turbulence. The consequences to us in the U.S. are many and varied. A number of U.S. banks may be in jeopardy. Some industries and many localities face serious hardships. And even as others momentarily remain unaffected or even benefited, an economic fire storm may overtake all of us. Only wise and sometimes swift government policy provides the possibility of moderating these consequences — and policy formation will be at least partially blinded in the absence of effective intelligence.

A number of less-developed nations are now indebted to banks, government and international institutions by an amount in excess of 900 billion dollars. It is less the debts than the consequences which flow from their payment or non-payment of the interest on those debts which holds a world economy in thrall.

It is unfortunate that many of those now in debt are countries which only recently adopted democratic governmental forms. Political and social instability in those countries can swiftly snuff out that recent progress and the danger may be as close as our own southern border.

The meeting of the five leading finance ministers of the industrial nations illustrates the urgency of cooperative international policy if these shoals are to be navigated. Intelligence is an indispensable mapmaker of the charts needed to navigate these shoals.

We have entered the age of high-technology married to the information age of microchip, super-computer, and the new sophisticated robots known undramatically as "flexible means of production."

Labor-intensive industries will continue to die or adjust, move their operations to countries which suddenly enjoy comparative advantage or merge with successful foreign competitors.

There are virtually no American automobiles made entirely of American-made parts. The five leading Japanese car makers are all now operating on our soil. TV brings to every American home the \$3,990 blessing of the Yugo, and South Koreans will make their automotive presence vivid indeed with the \$4,995 Hyundai (Hondai).

There are all the makings of international tension in these facts — of disappearing American manufacture, of growing U.S. manufacturing unemployment. And the mix is one which threatens the growth of protectionism. And all this is the grist of governmental policy which will be increasingly dependent on accurate and early intelligence.

Some of the best work on this process of structural change is being done by the analysts in the CIA augmented by expertise derived from conferences, many of them unclassified, with business, universities, think tanks and others.

Of what importance is this? Most observers who have studied the structural change I have referred to are of the opinion that we are entering the greatest threshold of destabilizing change in the history of man — greater than the change set into motion with the birth of cultivated agriculture, greater than the industrial age which followed, greater than mass manufacture, greater than the birth of the service economy which now provides more than 70 percent of our jobs. We have entered the age of information and we will wander through it blindly unless effective intelligence is an instrument which helps shape prompt, effective and peaceful policy. Without it there is the greater certainty of turbulent, divisive and dangerous economic conflicts.

The fact that I am concentrating on intelligence requirements for the balance of this decade may leave the misleading impression, especially in areas involving the dramatic economic difficulties we are likely to face, that the intelligence community is or should be the sole source of the information and judgment required for wise and timely government policy. It is clear that in specific fields and on a number of the potential difficulties which lie ahead, the Department of the Treasury, the State Department, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the Department of Commerce each have specific responsibilities which are assisted by sophisticated sources of information available to them. Contributions made by the intelligence community to those key government agencies are on the one hand supplementary and on the other indispensable. Not only must each of these instruments of the federal government seek to improve their own sources of advanced knowledge and judgment, not only must the intelligence community make a unique contribution to that input, but it may well be that the greatest contribution which may be required in the interval ahead is one which addresses itself to more effective coordination of sources of intelligence without which the policy responses may prove inadequate or late.

There are other very specific intelligence tasks which will be of increasing importance for the balance of this decade. Some of them are altogether new. Regrettably, almost none of them are easy. Yet they are indispensable. I'll refer to them briefly.

Among the urgent tasks for intelligence will be to fathom the means by which the Soviet Union intends to derive the benefits of the information age while withholding from its managers the technology and the freedom to use it which are essential to eminence in the revolutionary structural change taking place.

Linked to the challenges of the information age, a host of intelligence questions emerge from the convulsive demographic changes taking place in the USSR. These changes are shifting the balance of population to Moslem Russia and away from the shrinking population of Mother Russia where its government, industry and education are concentrated. By what means can these ethnic tensions in European and Asian Russia be exacerbated?

Is it possible that the Soviet Union had chosen to buy and steal the high technology it requires because those means of acquiring the most advanced technology are easier and cheaper than inventing and producing their own high-tech breakthroughs. Their technical ability is surely not the total impediment.

The spreading high technology capability in the Third World creates an increased difficulty in averting transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. And this too will complicate the task for intelligence.

This new environment suggests still another need which partially involves intelligence and partially the continuous planning for industrial mobilization which is the Defense Department's responsibility. That question is, how do we manage our economy in an emergency when we are increasingly dependent on strategic materials, facilities, processes in other nations which may or may not be amenable or reliable when needed?

There is still another intelligence question which addresses itself to the periodic difficulties we have in securing participation by our allies in one or another of the international difficulties we confront. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this

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question is why nations which have suffered far more than we have, the destruction of life and property by terrorists, appear quite unwilling to associate themselves with us in any action to redress state-sponsored terrorism.

Do we really understand why this is so? Are we altogether clear why neutralism and unilateralism play as large a role as they do in Europe? May not the distaste for us among many Europeans exist because they correctly perceive the Soviet danger and correctly judge that they cannot moderate that danger, while we, by opposing the Soviet Union would involve our allies in a risky and costly hazard they are not prepared to assume?

Can we win the war of systems if we cannot win the war of ideas, or are unwilling to pay for what it takes to do so? The Soviet Union spends far more to jam VOA, BBC, Deutsche Welle and Radio Francais than all of us together spend in our efforts to reach the Soviet Union. Are there means we have neglected?

Among the tasks facing intelligence for the balance of this decade which are pressing even at this moment is the redefinition and legitimization of covert action, unless of course we are prepared to accept the notion that covert action is legitimate if used by the Soviet Union, its client states, as well as the states which sponsor terrorism, but unacceptable as a counterforce to be used by the United States. We are no longer in Henry Stimson's world where as he said "gentlemen do not read others' mail," or George Kennan's world where he said "if covert action cannot be kept secret, it must not exist."

And closely linked to this, a fresh assessment must be made of the consequences of sharply limiting the presence of the KGB on our soil. The Soviet Union's pervasive capabilities for telephonic eavesdropping enjoy immunity among us, and they operate from key urban locations.

How can genuine symmetry be achieved in the privileges the Soviet Union enjoys among us and those they accord us in their midst? This is a major challenge which will continue to bedevil U.S. intelligence.

If the Soviet Union is long permitted to enjoy a field day in the United States, it should be noted that they have not had uninterrupted success in many of the world areas under their influence.

We must better understand what is producing Soviet distress among its clients elsewhere in the world and particularly in Africa. That distress varies, but it has included Egypt, Somalia, Mozambique, Grenada, South Yemen, and Tanzania. There are now several on-going insurgencies fighting against Soviet-backed Marxist regimes, the wave of the future is not assuredly theirs.

Do we periodically subject our most certain conclusions and cherished conceptions about our adversary to remorseless reexamination? For example, are we too ready to assume that the Soviet Union's economic problems significantly diminish the continuing danger to our security represented by Soviet power and will.

It is clear from much that I have said that the tasks which lie ahead for intelligence are both different and greater than any which the intelligence community has previously confronted. There will be many problems in dealing with this painful reality. Almost all of them are affected significantly by the public's misconceptions, let alone repeated evidence of media hostility. There are problems which are bureaucratic; others which are

budgetary. There are problems which flow from the very nature of a democratic state and some which flow from the peculiarly American culture. We have the remarkable tendency to look at the mirror when we consider our adversaries, and mirror-imaging is the curse of accurate intelligence.

We must also ask: can our intelligence be as good as it must be as long as our knowledge of foreign languages and cultures remains as poor as it is, especially when that handicap is further compounded by the disinvolvement of our centers of learning, research, science and technology, some of whom shun "contaminating" contact with the world of intelligence?

I will conclude with a prophecy and a challenge. One is unavoidable and the other as yet unmet.

Less than 50 years ago, this nation unlike England, had no need for economic intelligence. Whatever intelligence we had was focused on the capabilities and intentions rooted in dangers we perceived to be military.

During the remainder of the decade, I suggest that the greater threats to stability will flow from hazards which are economic, social, cultural and political. Do not misunderstand me. I am not suggesting that the military dangers have receded. They have changed their character, but are painfully with us. But a new panoply of dangerous troubles create urgent intelligence needs in the years immediately ahead.

Now the challenge! The actors in this new international drama are not only governments, but they include industries, labor unions, universities, banks, stock and commodity exchanges.

Intelligence has thus far been essentially limited to informing other government sectors. We impose understandable limits, and they are sharp, to keep the world of foreign intelligence and our domestic life apart. We also have our antitrust laws. We do not, as the Japanese do, have an instrument like MITI which performs some of the coordinating and judgmental functions for Japanese industry.

Yet, how do we meet the manifold challenges of the Information Age? How do we share essential intelligence with the private sectors of our society, the sectors upon whom tomorrow's eminence depends?

And even were that intelligence to be shared, there remains the central problem which exists even in the most urgent governmental use of intelligence — how to make effective use of the information? By informing a man about to be hanged of the exact size, location and strength of the rope, you do not remove either the hangman or the certainty of his being hanged.

All that intelligence can do is seek to concentrate the mind sufficiently to reduce the chance of unanticipated crisis, or, more hopefully, and less likely, avert it altogether.